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1907 
Boumediene v. Bush: Habeas Corpus, Exhaustion, and 
the Special Circumstances Exception 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On November 20, 2008, six native Algerian detainees at 
Guantanamo anxiously listened over a phone line for District Judge 
Richard Leon’s ruling from the bench on their writ of habeas corpus 
petitions.1 After numerous legal proceedings and close to seven years 
of detention, five of the men learned that because the Government 
failed to sufficiently justify their detention, the court would grant 
their petitions and order their release.2 
Judge Leon’s decision followed six days of closed-door hearings, 
where testimony and evidence was offered to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that these men where in fact enemy 
combatants.3 According to the Government, the petitioners 
“planned to travel to Afghanistan in late 2001 and take up arms 
against U.S. and allied forces.”4 Despite the Government’s 
submission of 53 pages of narrative and approximately 650 more of 
exhibits, Judge Leon found the Government relied exclusively on 
information from a classified document given by an unnamed source 
to support its allegations against the petitioners.5 In addition, the 
court found that the Government failed to provide sufficient 
evidence to effectively evaluate the credibility of the unnamed 
 
 1. William Glaberson, Judge Declares Five Detainees Held Illegally, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
18, 2008, at A1. 
 2. See Boumediene v. Bush, 579 F. Supp. 2d 191, 197–98 (D.D.C. 2008). The names 
of the five men whose petitions were granted are Lakhdar Boumediene, Mohamed Nechla, 
Hadj Boudella, Mustafa Ait Idir, and Saber Lahmar. Id. at 193, 198. 
 3. Id. at 195–96. In deciding whether the petitioners had a right to habeas corpus, the 
Supreme Court delegated the task of defining enemy combatant to the habeas court. See 
Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2271 (2008) (“The extent of the showing required of 
the Government in these cases is a matter to be determined.”). After a four day hearing, the 
Court defined an enemy combatant as “an individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or 
al Qaeda forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or 
its coalition partners. This includes any person who has committed a belligerent act or has 
directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces.” Boumediene, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 
196 (quoting Boumediene v. Bush, 583 F. Supp. 2d 133, 135 (D.D.C. 2008)). 
 4. Boumediene, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 196. 
 5. Id. at 195–97. 
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source.6 While Judge Leon found that the information relied upon 
by the unnamed source “was undoubtedly sufficient for the 
intelligence purposes for which it was prepared, it is not sufficient for 
the purposes for which a habeas court must now evaluate it.”7 The 
court explained further that “[t]o allow enemy combatancy to rest 
on so thin a reed would be inconsistent with this Court’s  
obligation . . . to protect petitioners from the risk of erroneous 
detention.”8 
Judge Leon’s decision came only five months after the Supreme 
Court’s decision, in Boumediene v. Bush, to grant Guantanamo 
detainees the ability to challenge their detention by applying for a 
writ of habeas corpus in federal court.9 The fact that such a hearing 
was ever held underlies a significant aspect of the Supreme Court’s 
decision. Following the Court’s decision in Boumediene, the 
detainees were allowed to forego the review procedures already 
available to them by the Combatant Status Review Tribunals 
(CSRTs) and the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA)—a legislatively 
created habeas substitute that none of the detainees even attempted 
to use—and proceed immediately to federal district court.10 
At first glance, the Boumediene decision appears to stand as a 
marked departure from the exhaustion doctrine of habeas corpus. 
Developed mostly in the state criminal context, the exhaustion 
doctrine requires state prisoners to exhaust all state judicial remedies 
before they proceed with their habeas petition in federal court.11 
Thus, while petitioners may seek to challenge the constitutionality of 
their detention at any time, such applications will likely be rejected 
unless the petitioner has exhausted the remedies available in state 
court.12 
 
 6. Id. at 197.  
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2275–76 (2008). 
 10. Id. at 2275. 
 11. See Harbison v. Bell, 129 S. Ct. 1481, 1488 (2009) (“[Habeas petitioners] must 
exhaust their claims in state court before seeking federal habeas relief.”); Matthew L. 
Anderson, Note, Requiring Unwanted Habeas Corpus Petitions to State Supreme Courts for 
Exhaustion Purposes: Too Exhausting, 79 MINN. L. REV. 1197, 1200–01 (1995). 
 12. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (2006) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus on 
behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted 
unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the 
State . . . .”); Larry W. Yackle, The Exhaustion Doctrine in Federal Habeas Corpus: An 
Argument for a Return to First Principles, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 393 (1983). 
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Despite its roots in the state criminal context, over the years the 
Supreme Court has extended the doctrine to other circumstances. 
For example, in Gusik v. Schilder,13 the Supreme Court recognized 
the doctrine’s application to courts-martial cases.14 In extending the 
exhaustion doctrine to this new context, the Court remarked, “The 
policy underlying [exhaustion] is as pertinent to the collateral attack 
of military judgments as it is to collateral attack of judgments 
rendered in state courts.”15 
Among the policies underlying exhaustion are two fundamental 
principles: comity and judicial efficiency.16 Comity, a principle which 
traces its genesis to interactions among the courts of foreign nations, 
requires “the recognition that the courts of coordinate systems can 
and must exercise forbearance in cases in which both are interested, 
lest they interfere with each other, create confusion and distrust, and 
sacrifice the utility that comes with cooperation.”17 Thus, by 
requiring federal courts to defer adjudication until the appropriate 
state court has rendered a decision, the exhaustion doctrine 
promotes inter-system respect and predictability.18 In a similar vein, 
judicial efficiency encourages state courts to fully determine and 
accurately document legal findings involving the petitioner’s 
claims.19 Furthermore, judicial efficiency “fosters an orderly process 
for habeas appeals by . . . allowing prisoners to make only one 
transition between the two forums.”20 Perhaps most important, in 
requiring the petitioner to fully adjudicate his or her claims in a state 
proceeding, the petitioner has an opportunity to refine his or her 
habeas petition or even abandon the petition altogether.21 
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Boumediene v. Bush22 to 
allow the petitioners to proceed directly with their habeas petitions 
in federal court while other judicial remedies remained unexplored 
sparked a rather curt dissent from Chief Justice Roberts.23 Roberts 
 
 13. 340 U.S. 128 (1950). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 131–32. 
 16. Anderson, supra note 11, at 1202. 
 17. Yackle, supra note 12, at 394. 
 18. See Anderson, supra note 11, at 1202. 
 19. Id. at 1204. 
 20. Id.  
 21. Id.  
 22. 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). 
 23. Id. at 2279 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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found it remarkable that “this Court [did] not require petitioners to 
exhaust their remedies under the statute; [nor] wait to see whether 
those remedies [would] prove sufficient to protect petitioners’ 
rights.”24 Roberts asserted that it was “grossly premature”25 for the 
Court to allow the petitioners to avoid exhaustion “without first 
assessing whether the remedies the DTA system provides vindicate 
whatever rights petitioners may claim.”26 
Despite Chief Justice Robert’s pointed criticism, the Court 
appears to do little to justify its apparent departure from the 
exhaustion doctrine. Instead, the only justifications given by the 
Court are that exhaustion would “require additional months, if not 
years”27 of litigation and that the Guantanamo detainee petitions 
arise under “‘exceptional’ circumstances.”28 Notwithstanding the 
Court’s apparent lackluster justifications for avoiding exhaustion, in 
comparing the Guantanamo detainee petitions with the principles 
extracted from the state habeas petitions, interesting distinctions 
arise. In light of this comparison, the Court’s decision not to require 
exhaustion appears to stand on solid precedential footing and 
strengthens the Court’s conclusion that the Guantanamo detainee 
circumstances are in fact exceptional. This Note will discuss these 
distinctions and comparisons in an attempt to better understand the 
Court’s decision not to require exhaustion and to explain why the 
unique circumstances of the Guantanamo detainee petitions justify 
such a decision. 
This Note proceeds by first discussing the history of the 
exhaustion doctrine in both the state court system and the military 
court context. Part III will turn to a discussion of the Court’s 
decision in Boumediene v. Bush, commencing with a discussion of the 
judicial and political events leading up to the decision and 
concluding with a detailed analysis of the Court’s decision. Part IV 
will compare the principles underlying the Boumediene decision with 
those of the state and military courts and discuss how the 
Boumediene context truly is exceptional and how the Court’s 
decision to not require exhaustion is consistent with habeas 
 
 24. Id. at 2280. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 2280–81. 
 27. Id. at 2275 (majority opinion). 
 28. Id. at 2263 (citing Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 169 
(2004); Duigan v. United States, 274 U.S. 195, 200 (1927)). 
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precedent. Part V gives a brief conclusion to the analysis and 
arguments presented in this Note. 
II. THE EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE 
In its simplest terms, the exhaustion doctrine in federal habeas 
corpus “postpones federal review until petitioners have exhausted 
state judicial remedies still available for the treatment of their federal 
claims at the time they wish to apply for federal relief.”29 While some 
judicial opinions appear to define and utilize the doctrine as a quasi-
jurisdictional barrier to federal courts,30 the doctrine actually 
concerns whether the timing of the petition, in light of the 
surrounding circumstances, is appropriate.31 Thus, while federal 
courts always have proper jurisdiction to entertain a habeas petition, 
under most circumstances federal courts will dismiss the petition if 
the petitioner has yet to exhaust all judicial remedies of the other 
court system. 
A. Early Beginnings 
One of the earliest pronouncements by the Supreme Court 
regarding the exhaustion doctrine in federal habeas proceedings is 
found in Ex parte Royall.32 The petitioner in Royall had been 
indicted by a grand jury for violating a Virginia statute that required 
sellers of bond coupons to have a state-issued license and pay 
significant taxes.33 The petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus 
from the federal circuit court, alleging that the statute was 
“repugnant to section ten of article one of the Constitution of the 
United States.”34 The circuit court denied the writ, stating the court 
“was without jurisdiction to discharge the prisoner from 
 
 29. Yackle, supra note 12, at 393. 
 30. The use of the exhaustion doctrine as a jurisdictional barrier stems from language 
found in the Supreme Court decision Rose v. Lundy where the majority required “total 
exhaustion” of all state claims before a petitioner’s writ be heard in federal courts. 455 U.S. 
509, 522 (1982). Based on this language, it can be argued that a habeas petition is not ripe 
(i.e., the court is without jurisdiction) until all state claims have been adjudicated in state 
courts. See Yackle, supra note 12, at 424–31. 
 31. Yackle, supra note 12, at 412 (“[T]he exhaustion doctrine was not a device for 
cutting off the federal forum to state prisoners, but was only a rule of timing.”). 
 32. 117 U.S. 241 (1886). 
 33. Id. at 242. 
 34. Id. at 243. 
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prosecution.”35 Although the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of 
the writ, the Court disagreed with the circuit court’s assessment of 
its own jurisdiction. The Supreme Court found that the circuit court 
did in fact have the ability to release the prisoner, as the 
Congressional grant of habeas review was broad enough to 
encompass such claims.36 Notwithstanding this ability, the Court 
found that simply because the circuit court could release the 
prisoner, it “[was] not bound in every case to exercise such a power 
immediately upon application . . . .”37 The circuit court’s broad 
authority to hear habeas petitions includes the “discretion as to the 
time and mode in which it will exert the powers conferred upon 
it.”38 
The Court went on to detail what factors the circuit court should 
consider when determining whether to grant a petitioner’s 
application for the writ: 
[D]iscretion should be exercised in the light of the relations 
existing, under our system of government, between the judicial 
tribunals of the Union and of the States, and in recognition of the 
fact that the public good requires that those relations be not 
disturbed by unnecessary conflict between courts equally bound to 
guard and protect rights secured by the Constitution.39 
In effect, the Royall standard instructs the lower court to exercise its 
ability to hear the habeas petition only after a thorough evaluation of 
whether entertaining such a petition would unnecessarily impinge on 
the duties and responsibilities of the state tribunal. If hearing the 
petition would infringe on the province of the state court, the Royall 
court encourages the federal court to deny the petition in the 
interest of comity. 
Ironically, the most enduring legacy of the Royall decision 
actually stems from a misconstruction of the Court’s holding. In an 
attempt to articulate a comprehensive standard for evaluating habeas 
petitions, the Court held: 
[W]here a person is in custody, under process from a State  
court . . . and it is claimed that he is restrained . . . in violation of 
 
 35. Id. at 245. 
 36. Id. at 247. 
 37. Id. at 251. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
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the Constitution of the United States, the Circuit Court has a 
discretion, whether it will discharge him upon habeas corpus, in 
advance of his trial . . . that discretion, however, to be subordinated 
to any special circumstances requiring immediate action.40 
The Court further explained that even after the prisoner has been 
convicted in the state court, the federal court still has discretion as to 
whether it will proceed with the writ of habeas corpus, or require the 
prisoner to appeal to the highest court of the state.41 Thus, the 
standard announced in Royall was effectually a matter of timing, not 
a hard and fast rule requiring exhaustion. Notwithstanding the 
emphasis on judicial discretion, the Court’s opinion was quickly 
construed to mean that exhaustion was the “general rule” unless 
special circumstances required immediate action.42 In effect, 
subsequent opinions inverted the Royall standard and created the 
modern-day exhaustion doctrine.43 
While courts consistently treated the exhaustion doctrine as a 
general rule following the Royall decision, widespread use of the 
special circumstances exception persisted.44 In an effort to clarify the 
contours of the exception, the Court readdressed the issue in  
Ex parte Hawk.45 The Hawk Court reaffirmed the general principle 
that a petitioner from state court must exhaust all of his state 
remedies before a habeas petition to the federal courts will be 
entertained.46 The Court further clarified that “only in rare cases 
where exceptional circumstances of peculiar urgency are shown to 
exist” should the federal courts intervene while avenues for state 
adjudication still remain to be used.47 Although the Court resisted 
the opportunity to clarify what exactly would constitute an 
exceptional circumstance, the Court did hint that a federal court 
should likely intervene immediately when the petitioner would 
 
 40. Id. at 252–53. 
 41. Id. at 253. 
 42. See Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459, 466 (1900) (“Hence, the general rule that 
the courts of the United States should not interfere by habeas corpus with the custody by state 
authorities . . . until after final action by the state courts . . . .”); Yackle, supra note 12, at 404–
08. 
 43. See Yackle, supra note 12, at 404–05. 
 44. Id. at 404–08. 
 45. 321 U.S. 114 (1944). 
 46. Id. at 117. 
 47. Id. 
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otherwise be remediless.48 
B. Codification and a Return to First Principles 
Four years following the Hawk decision, Congress codified the 
exhaustion doctrine in 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Although the expressed 
intent of Congress was to simply codify the common law doctrine,49 
the statute appears to have attempted to define the “special 
circumstances” where exhaustion may not be required. The statute 
first incorporates the general principle of exhaustion: “[a]n 
application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in 
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be 
granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the 
remedies available in the court of the State.”50 Notwithstanding this 
general prohibition on collateral habeas review, the statute codifies 
two general exceptions: if “there is an absence of available State 
corrective process; or circumstances exist that render such process 
ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant” the federal courts 
need not require exhaustion.51 Thus, instead of relying on the vague 
notion of special circumstances, the statute attempts to limit 
avoidance of exhaustion to circumstances where the state tribunal’s 
remedy is ineffective to protect the rights of the habeas petitioner. 
A mere two years after codification of the exhaustion doctrine, 
the Supreme Court retreated somewhat from its previous 
pronouncements of the exhaustion doctrine. In Frisbie v. Collins,52 
the petitioner, acting as his own lawyer, brought a habeas action in 
the appropriate United States District Court arguing that he was 
tried and convicted under circumstances that violated “the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Federal 
Kidnapping Act.”53 Although there was some question as to whether 
the petitioner still had a viable state remedy, the court ultimately 
decided that was not relevant.54 The Court reasoned that while 
 
 48. Id. at 118. 
 49. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 516 n.8 (1982) (noting that Congress, in 
codifying the exhaustion doctrine, sought only to declare “existing law as affirmed by the 
Supreme Court”) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 80–308, at A180 (1947)). 
 50. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (2006). 
 51. Id. at (b)(1)(B)(i)–(ii). 
 52. 342 U.S. 519 (1952). 
 53. Id. at 520. 
 54. Id. 
DO NOT DELETE 2/8/2010 7:55 PM 
1907 Special Circumstances Exception 
 1915 
“[t]here is no doubt that as a general rule federal courts should deny 
the writ to state prisoners if there is ‘available State corrective 
process[,]’ . . . this general rule is not rigid and inflexible; district 
courts may deviate from it and grant relief in special 
circumstances.”55 Highlighting the ultimate discretion granted to the 
district courts, the Court stated that “[w]hether such circumstances 
exist calls for a factual appraisal by the court in each special 
situation.”56 Perhaps most surprising, the Court refused to further 
delineate when such special circumstances would exist: “It would 
serve no useful purpose to review those special circumstances in 
detail. They are peculiar to this case, may never come up again, and a 
discussion of them could not give precision to the ‘special 
circumstances’ rule.”57 
Underlying the Court’s decision in Frisbie are what appear to be 
remnants of the initial principles first announced in Royall. The 
Frisbie Court appears to retreat a bit from the strict statutory 
language and to once again advocate a flexible, fact-intensive 
evaluation of whether the habeas court should immediately 
intervene. Thus, while the district court certainly expressed the 
strong presumption towards exhaustion of state remedies, the Frisbie 
Court suggested that the district court should still appraise the 
factual context of the habeas application before requiring exhaustion. 
C. Other Contexts: Military Courts 
The Supreme Court’s preference for exhaustion holds true for 
writ applications in other contexts as well. In Gusik v. Shilder,58 the 
Supreme Court faced a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf 
of a petitioner held pursuant to a court-martial conviction.59 While 
the District Court granted the writ on evidence of procedural failures 
in the court-martial proceeding, the Court of Appeals reversed. The 
Court of Appeals held that “there was an administrative remedy 
which petitioner had not exhausted” and consequently dismissed the 
petition.60 In considering whether federal courts should require 
 
 55. Id. at 520–21 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1950)). 
 56. Id. at 521. 
 57. Id. at 522. 
 58. 340 U.S. 128 (1950). 
 59. Id. at 129. 
 60. Id. at 130. The administrative remedy still available to the petitioner was to request 
a new trial from the Judge Advocate General. See id. at 130–31. 
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exhaustion of administrative remedies before entertaining a habeas 
petition from a military-court convict, the court informed its 
decision by analogizing from the principles employed in state habeas 
petitions to federal courts.61 
The Supreme Court recognized that in the state criminal 
context, “[i]f the state procedure provides a remedy, which though 
available has not been exhausted, the federal courts will not 
interfere.”62 In comparing the policies underlying this rule to the 
case at hand, the Court found several crucial similarities. First, the 
Court recognized that should the petitioner resort to the now 
available administrative remedy, “interference by the federal court 
may be wholly needless”63 and a waste of precious judicial resources. 
Second, the Court noted that should the administrative remedy 
prove adequate, “any friction between the federal court and the 
military or state tribunal is saved.”64 Thus, the Court recognized that 
in the interest of comity and judicial efficiency, exhaustion should be 
required.65 
The Court noted that denying the application until a future date 
“is in no sense a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. It is merely 
a deferment of resort to the writ until other corrective procedures are 
shown to be futile.”66 Based on this principle, the Court did not 
affirm the Court of Appeals’ dismissal, but rather reversed and 
remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to hold the case pending 
until the administrative remedy was fully pursued.67 Should the 
administrative remedy prove adequate, the petition could then be 
dismissed.68 Should the opposite occur, the petitioner is saved the 
time and expense of refiling his habeas petition.69 
D. Summary of the Exhaustion Doctrine 
Although the federal courts have authority to grant an 
application of the Great Writ, the Supreme Court has routinely 
 
 61. Id. at 131. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 132. 
 64. Id.  
 65. See id. at 133–34. 
 66. Id. at 132. 
 67. Id. at 133–34. 
 68. Id.  
 69. Id. at 134. 
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favored full exhaustion of state remedies before federal courts 
intervene with habeas proceedings. As the Gusik case illustrates, this 
principle holds true in other contexts as well. The exhaustion 
doctrine strongly suggests federal courts deny habeas applications 
out of respect for the other tribunal’s authority and to guard against 
useless exercise of federal judicial resources. 
III. BOUMEDIENE V. BUSH 
Despite the Supreme Court’s strong preference towards 
exhaustion, the Court in Boumediene v. Bush70 allowed the 
petitioners to proceed directly to federal court without exhausting 
the legislatively enacted remedy. Perhaps most surprising is the fact 
that the special circumstances exception was used not in protection 
of American citizens, but rather in favor of detainees accused of 
engaging in unlawful hostilities against the United States. To best 
understand the Supreme Court’s decision, a detailed analysis of the 
specific factual circumstances of the case in light of the surrounding 
judicial and legislative happenings is necessary. 
A. Background and Context 
In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 
Congress passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force which 
grants the President power “‘to use all necessary and appropriate 
force’” against all who either participated in any way in those attacks 
or gave refuge to those who participated.71 Under this authority, the 
Department of Defense ordered several “enemy combatants” to be 
transferred to Guantanamo Bay for detention.72 In Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld,73 a plurality of the Court recognized that the ability to 
detain individuals engaged in armed conflict against the United 
States was “so fundamental and accepted an incident to war as to be 
an exercise of the ‘necessary and appropriate force’ Congress has 
authorized the President to use.”74 Notwithstanding this explicit 
sanction of detention, the Court held that the “citizen-detainee 
 
 70. 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). 
 71. Id. at 2240 (quoting Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107–
243, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224 (2002)). 
 72. Id. 
 73. 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
 74. Id. at 518 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion). 
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seeking to challenge his classification as an enemy combatant must 
receive notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a fair 
opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual assertions before a 
neutral decisionmaker.”75 The Court suggested that this could be 
done “by an appropriately authorized and properly constituted 
military tribunal.”76 
In direct response to the Hamdi decision, the United States 
established the Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs).77 The 
CSRTs provide the detainee, both U.S. citizen and non-citizen alike, 
an opportunity to receive notice of the basis for his classification as 
an enemy combatant and to challenge the Government’s 
determination.78 
The petitioners in Boumediene were apprehended on battlefields 
ranging from Afghanistan to Bosnia and thereafter transferred to 
Guantanamo. Unlike some of the petitioners in other detainee 
cases,79 all of the petitioners were foreign nationals and “none is a 
citizen of a nation now at war with the United States.”80 All of the 
petitioners denied any affiliation with either al Qaeda which “carried 
out the September 11 attacks or the Taliban regime that provided 
sanctuary for al Qaeda.”81 Each of the petitioners received a separate 
CSRT proceeding and was deemed an enemy combatant.82 Each 
petitioner filed a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia.83 
Following dismissal in the District Court for want of jurisdiction 
and affirmation by the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court granted 
 
 75. Id. at 533. 
 76. Id. at 538. 
 77. Joseph Blocher, Comment, Combatant Status Review Tribunals: Answer to the 
Wrong Questions, 116 YALE L.J. 667, 670 (2006). 
 78. Brief for the Respondents at 49–50, Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008) 
(Nos. 06-1195, 06-1196), 2007 WL 2972541. 
 79. One of the first detainee habeas corpus cases of the War on Terror involved 
petitioner Jose Padilla, who was an American citizen captured in the Chicago O’Hare Airport 
and detained in North Carolina. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004). Petitioner 
Yaser Esam Hamdi, who was captured in Afghanistan and detained initially at Guantanamo Bay 
and later in South Carolina, held both Saudi and United States citizenship. See Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Tung Yin, Enemies of the State: Rational Classification in the 
War on Terrorism, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 903, 909–10, 935 (2007). 
 80. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2241. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
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certiorari for the habeas applications.84 The Supreme Court reversed, 
“holding that 28 U.S.C. § 2241 extended statutory habeas corpus 
jurisdiction to Guantanamo.”85 On remand, the petitioners’ cases 
were consolidated and heard in two proceedings with opposite 
results.86 Judge Richard J. Leon dismissed the petitioners’ 
application, holding the petitioners had no rights that were 
protectable by habeas corpus, while Judge Joyce Hens Green found 
that the detainees had vindicable rights under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.87 
While appeals were pending, and likely acting in response to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Rasul, Congress passed the Detainee 
Treatment Act (DTA), which granted exclusive jurisdiction to review 
CSRT decisions to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
and provided that “no court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction 
to hear or consider . . . an application for a writ of habeas corpus 
filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by the Department of 
Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.”88 In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,89 
however, the Supreme Court held that the DTA did not apply 
retroactively to cases pending before its enactment, which included 
the petitioners in Boumediene.90 This decision prompted Congress to 
pass the Military Commissions Act (MCA), which, among other 
things, amended 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) to reflect the jurisdiction-
stripping language of the DTA91 and established the effective date of 
 
 84. Id.  
 85. Id. (citing Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 473 (2004)). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. (omission in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006)). 
 89. 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
 90. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2241. 
 91. As amended by the MCA, 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2006) now reads: 
(1) No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider an 
application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by 
the United States who has been determined by the United States to have been 
properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination. 
(2) Except as provided [in the DTA (i.e. granting CSRT appellate jurisdiction 
exclusively to the D.C. Federal Court of Appeals)], no court, justice, or judge, shall 
have jurisdiction to hear or consider any other action against the United States or its 
agents relating to any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or 
conditions of confinement of an alien who is or was detained by the United States 
and has been determined by the United States to have been properly detained as an 
enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination. 
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these changes as September 11, 2001.92 Thus, working in tandem, 
these provisions stripped all courts of any ability to entertain a writ 
application from a Guantanamo detainee and leave the CSRT and 
DTA review as the only available recourse for petitioners seeking to 
challenge their detention as enemy combatants. 
Following the passage of the MCA, the Court of Appeals 
concluded that the court was without jurisdiction to hear the 
petitioners’ habeas corpus applications and dismissed the case.93 The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari.94 
B. The Opinion of the Court 
In Boumediene v. Bush, the Court first recognized that the MCA 
unquestionably denies habeas jurisdiction to all federal courts. Thus, 
“if the statute is valid, petitioners’ cases must be dismissed.”95 To 
determine whether the statute was valid, the Court first considered 
whether enemy combatants detained outside of the United States 
were entitled to the writ of habeas corpus.96 
The Court first determined that the petitioners’ status as enemy 
combatants was not, in and of itself, a bar to habeas corpus relief.97 
Turning to the question of detainment outside of the United States, 
the Court found no ready equivalent to Guantanamo Bay in the 
common law record.98 The Government adamantly asserted that the 
United States does not claim sovereignty over Guantanamo, and 
therefore the Suspension Clause had no application.99 While the 
Court agreed that the United States did not, and has never, claimed 
ultimate jurisdiction over Guantanamo, technical sovereignty did 
 
 92. Section 7(b) of the MCA provides: 
The amendment made by [the MCA to 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)] shall take effect on 
the date of the enactment of this Act, and shall apply to all cases, without exception, 
pending on or after the date of the enactment of this Act which relate to any aspect 
of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of detention of an alien 
detained by the United States since September 11, 2001. 
Military Commissions Act, § 7(b), 120 Stat. 2600, 2635 (2006). 
 93. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct at 2242. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 2244. 
 97. Id. at 2248. 
 98. Id. at 2249–51. 
 99. Id. at 2252. 
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“not end the analysis.”100 The Court found that two principles are 
embodied in the concept of sovereignty: the exercise of dominion or 
control, and legal sovereignty, “meaning a claim of right.”101 
In reviewing the common law, the Court found that 
extraterritorial application of the Constitution did not turn solely on 
whether the Government asserted legal sovereignty over a given area, 
but rather “questions of extraterritoriality turn on objective factors 
and practical concerns . . . .”102 As a practical matter, the Court 
found it unconvincing that the Government, by abstaining from 
asserting any sort of legal claim of right, could then operate without 
constitutional constraints.103 Furthermore, because the assertion of 
legal sovereignty is a power reserved for the political branches, the 
Court recognized real danger in allowing the scope of the writ to 
“be subject to manipulation by those whose power it is designed to 
restrain.”104 If the Court were to grant the petitioners’ writs, the 
Court found “no reason to believe an order from a federal court 
would be disobeyed at Guantanamo. No Cuban court has 
jurisdiction to hear these petitioners’ claims, and no law other than 
the laws of the United States applies at the naval station.”105 
Having evaluated the practical concerns, the Court turned its 
attention to objective factors derived from common law.106  
 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 2258. In other words, the Court is arguing that habeas corpus jurisprudence 
has traditionally followed the common law approach. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. 
Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, Substantive Rights, and the War on Terror, 120 HARV. L. 
REV. 2029, 2033 (2007). In Fallon and Meltzer’s article, they argue that judges operate within 
two models of judicial action: the “Agency Model” and the “Common Law Model.” Id. 
Judges operating within the Agency Model “regard themselves as the agents of those who 
enacted, or ratified, pertinent statutory or constitutional provisions; they should assume that 
those provisions were framed to be as determinate as possible; and they should minimize 
judicial creativity.” Id. The Common Law Model views judges as “having a creative, 
discretionary function in adapting constitutional and statutory language––which is frequently 
vague, and even more frequently reflects imperfect foresight––to novel circumstances.” Id. 
Thus, under the Common Law Model, while judges are still agents of the law, the judges view 
themselves as holding “bounded authority to interpret legal mandates in light of considerations 
of fairness, policy, and prudence.” Id. The article goes on to argue that federal habeas corpus 
jurisprudence has historically been dominated by the Common Law Model. Id. 
 103. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2258–59. 
 104. Id. at 2259. 
 105. Id. at 2251. 
 106. The court derived these factors from an analysis of Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 
763 (1950). In Eisentrager, the Court dismissed the habeas corpus petitions of two German 
nationals confined by the United States Army in Germany. Id. In dismissing the petitions, the 
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The Court noted three factors relevant in determining the 
extraterritorial reach of the Suspension Clause: “(1) the citizenship 
and status of the detainee and the adequacy of the process through 
which the status determination was made; (2) the nature of the sites 
where apprehension and then detention took place; and (3) the 
practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner’s entitlement to 
the writ.”107 In applying these factors to the case at hand, the Court 
first found that the status of the detainees and the process by which 
their status was determined fell “well short of the procedures and 
adversarial mechanisms that would eliminate the need for habeas 
corpus review.”108 Second, the Court found that the nature of the 
site of detention merited application of the writ.109 Lastly, the Court 
noted that the Government presented no persuasive argument that 
the mission of Guantanamo “would be compromised if habeas 
 
Court found persuasive that each petitioner: 
(a) is an enemy alien; (b) has never been or resided in the United States; (c) was 
captured outside of our territory and there held in military custody as a prisoner of 
war; (d) was tried and convicted by a Military Commission sitting outside the 
United States; (e) for offenses against laws of war committed outside the United 
States; (f) and is at all times imprisoned outside the United States. 
Id. at 777. 
 107. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2259. 
 108. Id. at 2260. The Court notes that in Eisentrager, the detainees did not contest their 
status as enemy aliens and had been convicted of war crimes after a full military court hearing. 
Id. at 2259. By contrast, in Boumediene, the detainees adamantly contest their status as enemy 
combatants and have never been convicted of any war crimes. Id. The Court further found 
significant procedural differences between the two cases. In Eisentrager, the “petitioners were 
charged by a bill of particulars that made detailed factual allegations against them.” Id. at 
2260. Furthermore, the petitioners were “entitled to representation by counsel, allowed to 
introduce evidence on their own behalf, and permitted to cross-examine the prosecution’s 
witnesses.” Id. By contrast, the CSRT hearings afforded the Boumediene petitioners were “far 
more limited.” Id. While the petitioners were “assigned a ‘Personal Representative’ to assist 
[them] during CSRT proceedings, the Secretary of the Navy’s memorandum makes clear that 
person is not the detainee’s lawyer or even his ‘advocate.’” Id. Furthermore, the Government’s 
evidence carries a “presumption of validity” and the detainees were only afforded the 
opportunity to present “reasonably available” evidence. Id. 
 109. Id. 2260–61. While the Court notes that both the detainees of Guantanamo and the 
Eisentrager prisoners were detained outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, the 
Court points out important distinctions between Landsberg Prison and Guantanamo Bay. Id. 
at 2260. Landsberg Prison was under the jurisdiction of the Allied Forces. Id. Thus, the 
United States was answerable to its allies for its actions at the prison. Id. Further, the United 
States did not intend to occupy the territory indefinitely nor seek to displace German 
institutions. Id. At Guantanamo, the United States by express agreement with Cuba exercises 
“complete jurisdiction and control” over Guantanamo “and may continue to exercise such 
control permanently if it so chooses.” Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 480 (2004) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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corpus courts had jurisdiction to hear the detainees’ claims.”110 
Combining both the practical concerns and the Court’s 
conclusions as to the relevant three factors, the Court held that  
“Art. I, § 9, cl. 2, of the Constitution has full effect at Guantanamo 
Bay. If the privilege of habeas corpus is to be denied to the detainees 
now before us, Congress must act in accordance with the 
requirements of the Suspension Clause.”111 As neither the MCA nor 
the AUMF purported to formally suspend the writ of habeas corpus, 
the question then became whether the DTA review in the Court of 
Appeals constituted an adequate substitute to traditional habeas 
proceedings.112 
At the outset of this determination, the Court noted the unique 
characteristics of the DTA. While most of the substitute habeas 
statutes were actually attempts to streamline habeas review, the DTA 
was admittedly an attempt to limit its contours.113 The Court noted 
that traditional grants of habeas review give courts broad authority 
to “determine the issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of 
law,”114 to determine whether the court had jurisdiction to hear the 
case, and to determine whether the sentence “imposed was not 
authorized by law or otherwise open to collateral attack.”115 In 
contrast, the DTA limits the Court of Appeals to only “assess 
whether the CSRT complied with the ‘standards and procedures 
specified by the Secretary of Defense’ and whether those standards 
and procedures are lawful.”116 Thus, the intent of the DTA appears 
not to be a system coextensive with traditional habeas review, but 
rather to create a much more limited proceeding.117 
As the DTA is limited to simply reviewing the determination 
made by the CSRT, the Court first examined whether procedural 
 
 110. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2261. 
 111. Id. at 2262. 
 112. Id.  
 113. Id. at 2263–66. The Court cites a revealing statement by Senator Lindsey Graham, 
who stated that the DTA “extinguish[es] these habeas and other actions in order to effect a 
transfer of jurisdiction over these cases to the DC Circuit Court” and, further, that it “create[s] 
in their place a very limited judicial review of certain military administrative decisions.” Id. 
(alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 151 CONG. REC. S14263 
(daily ed. Dec. 21, 2005)). 
 114. Id. at 2265 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b) (2006)). 
 115. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b)). 
 116. Id. (quoting Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 
1005(e)(2)(C), 119 Stat. 2742). 
 117. Id. at 2266. 
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defects in the lower proceeding would restrict or negatively impact 
the adequacy of the review process.118 In examining the CSRT, the 
Court noted that even if all parties are genuinely interested in 
achieving a just outcome, serious risk of error still remains.119 First, 
the detainee has limited ability to locate and present exculpatory 
evidence.120 The detainee does not have assistance of counsel and 
may only present evidence if reasonably available.121 Second, hearsay 
evidence is admissible if “relevant and helpful.”122 Thus, while the 
detainee has the right to confront witnesses who testify against him, 
the “opportunity to question witnesses is likely to be more 
theoretical than real.”123 
In light of these serious risks of error, the Court analyzed 
whether the DTA review provides a means to remedy these errors.124 
The Court found that it is likely the DTA would allow the 
petitioners to assert any claim they seek to advance, “including their 
most basic claim: that the President has no authority under the 
AUMF to detain them indefinitely.”125 Notwithstanding this ability, 
the Court had serious reservations about whether “the DTA permits 
the Court of Appeals to make requisite findings of fact.”126 As 
aforementioned, the DTA review is limited to whether the CSRT 
procedures were properly followed and whether those procedures 
were lawful.127 With this severe limitation, the Court found no way 
to interpret the statute as to provide an opportunity for the 
petitioners to offer exculpatory evidence not part of the record from 
the earlier proceeding.128 Though the Court admitted that the DTA 
court may order production of any and all evidence in the possession 
of the Government that is relevant to the petitioner’s enemy 
combatant determination, “regardless of whether this evidence was 
put before the CSRT,” the Court found no opportunity to offer 
 
 118. See id. at 2268–69 (“[T]he necessary scope of habeas review in part depends upon 
the rigor of any earlier proceedings . . . .”). 
 119. Id. at 2269–70. 
 120. Id. at 2269. 
 121. Id.  
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 2270. 
 125. Id. at 2271. 
 126. Id. at 2272. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
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evidence discovered after the CSRT proceedings.129 This restriction 
implied to the Court that the DTA failed to afford a new 
opportunity to challenge the petitioner’s detention.130 
Taking the procedural defects of the CSRT and the limited 
review provided by the DTA in total, the Court found the process 
“an inadequate substitute for habeas corpus.”131 Thus, as MCA § 7 
strips all courts of habeas corpus jurisdiction yet fails to provide for 
an adequate substitute, the Court held the Act unconstitutional as an 
unauthorized suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.132 
The Court noted that its typical practice would be to decline to 
address whether the DTA provided an adequate substitute for habeas 
corpus until after the petitioner had exhausted that avenue.133 
Despite this standard practice of exhaustion, the Court found that 
the “gravity of the separation-of-powers issues raised by these cases 
and the fact that these detainees have been denied meaningful access 
to a judicial forum for a period of years render these cases 
exceptional.”134 In light of these exceptional circumstances, the 
Court held that “the petitioners in these cases need not exhaust the 
review procedures in the Court of Appeals before proceeding with 
their habeas actions in the District Court.”135 
C. Chief Justice Roberts’ Dissent 
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia,136 Thomas, and 
Alito, dissented. Roberts argued that the Court should have 
dismissed the petition and required the petitioners to first pursue 
their remedies under the MCA and DTA.137 Roberts asserted that 
habeas corpus is primarily “a procedural right, a mechanism for 
contesting the legality of executive detention.”138 Thus, regardless of 
whether the procedure is called “‘habeas’ or something else,” if there 
 
 129. Id.  
 130. Id. at 2272–73. 
 131. Id. at 2274. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 2262–63. 
 134. Id. at 2263. 
 135. Id. at 2275. 
 136. Justice Scalia also entered a separate dissenting opinion. His dissent, which is outside 
the scope of this Note, focuses on the historical contours of the writ of habeas corpus. See id. at 
2293 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 137. See id. at 2279 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 138. Id.  
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is a procedural avenue which protects a petitioner’s rights, the 
Constitution is satisfied.139 
Roberts noted that no petitioner had attempted to utilize the 
review process outlined by the DTA.140 Finding it “remarkabl[e]” 
that the Court did not require petitioners to exhaust the process 
under the DTA, he labeled the Court’s actions “grossly 
premature.”141 Had the Court required exhaustion, it could have 
reserved the question of constitutionality until first waiting to see 
whether the DTA vindicated “whatever rights petitioners may 
claim.”142 While requiring the petitioners to exhaust their remedies 
under the DTA may involve additional delay, Roberts reminded the 
Court that mandating exhaustion of statutory remedies in no way 
suspends the writ of habeas corpus, but merely defers usage of the 
writ until other proceedings are indeed shown to be inadequate.143 
Roberts further chided the Court for departing from what the 
majority itself deemed “the ordinary course” of the Court.144 He 
noted that while the Court justifies its departure “in light of the 
‘gravity’ of the constitutional issues presented and the prospect of 
additional delay,” such circumstances are precisely when the Court 
should cling to its ordinary course of business.145 As he so aptly put, 
“[a] principle applied only when unimportant is not much of a 
principle at all . . . .”146 
IV. EXHAUSTION IN THE DETAINEE CONTEXT 
Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent highlights some interesting aspects 
and glaring deficiencies in the Court’s opinion. Although the Court 
notes that unique separation-of-powers issues and substantial passage 
of time since the detainees’ initial capture make the Guantanamo 
detainee cases so exceptional as to not require exhaustion, the Court 
devotes very little of its lengthy opinion to discussing these issues. 
Notwithstanding the Court’s failure to fully address these key issues, 
the question remains whether the Court was incorrect in not 
 
 139. Id.  
 140. Id. at 2280. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 2280–81. 
 143. Id. at 2281. 
 144. Id. at 2282. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
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requiring exhaustion of the congressionally provided review process. 
In answering this question, a comparison of the policies underlying 
exhaustion with the specific circumstances of Boumediene is 
instructive. In light of these comparisons and distinctions, the 
Court’s decision not to require exhaustion becomes much more 
compelling than simply a desire to avoid any unnecessary delay. 
A. Comity 
The traditional justification for requiring complete exhaustion of 
state remedies before a habeas petitioner can proceed to federal court 
is comity.147 As first enunciated by the Court in Ex parte Royall, 
comity instructs us that when two overlapping court systems have a 
sincere interest in overseeing a particular claim, the courts should 
restrain from interfering with one another’s jurisdiction to the 
greatest extent possible.148 In the traditional habeas petition context, 
the federal court is encouraged to avoid interfering with the state 
court proceedings until all remedies available in the state system have 
been fully exhausted by the petitioner so that no unnecessary conflict 
arises between the two forums.149 The commitment to comity has 
become so ingrained in American jurisprudence that the Supreme 
Court has even required “total exhaustion” of petitions that contain 
“both unexhausted and exhausted claims.”150 
In the Respondent’s brief, the Government argues that should 
the Court find that the detainees have habeas corpus rights under 
the Suspension Clause, the Court should require the petitioners to 
exhaust their DTA remedies.151 After setting forth the general rule of 
exhaustion, the Government asserts that “[t]he comity 
considerations that underlie the exhaustion requirement are 
especially pressing here, given that petitioners seek to challenge the 
concurrent judgment of Congress and the President regarding the 
conduct of an ongoing war.”152 In effect, the Government uses 
comity to advance the point that the Court should defer to the 
wisdom of the political branches on matters concerning the conduct 
 
 147. Yackle, supra note 12, at 393–94. 
 148. See Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 251 (1886). 
 149. Id. 
 150. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982). 
 151. Brief for the Respondents at 41, Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008) 
(Nos. 06-1195, 06-1196), 2007 WL 2972541. 
 152. Id. at 42. 
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of an ongoing war. According to the Government, the principle of 
comity demands that the judicial branch respect the province of the 
political branches on all matters concerning warfare. 
In reviewing the fundamental principles of comity, however, the 
Government’s argument that comity demands exhaustion where 
branches of the same government are in dispute appears to be 
misplaced. Comity, at least in the exhaustion context, has 
traditionally encompassed only disputes between competing 
jurisdictions, not competing branches of government.153 Thus, in the 
United States, where both state and federal governments are 
sovereign in their own sphere, comity encourages federal courts to 
defer to the sovereignty of state courts unless special circumstances 
demand otherwise. By exercising such forbearance, federal courts are 
able to avoid “creat[ing] confusion and distrust, and sacrific[ing] the 
utility that comes with cooperation.”154 
Boumediene involves a rather distinctive power struggle. Instead 
of two sovereign court systems vying for jurisdictional prowess, 
Boumediene presents a unique separation-of-powers dilemma 
between the Executive and Judicial Branches. On the one hand, the 
Executive Branch is asserting its traditional war-time powers as 
justification for detention of alleged terrorists.155 On the other hand, 
the Judicial Branch is upholding its traditional power to guard 
against unlawful detention by the Executive Branch.156 This power 
struggle is complicated by the fact that the Executive Branch, with 
express legislative approval, is attempting to redefine the contours of 
the writ of habeas corpus—the very judicial instrument designed to 
guard against unlawful executive detention.157 Although Roberts 
suggests that the opinion disregards the collective wisdom of both 
Congress and the President,158 matters concerning the writ of habeas 
corpus are exactly the circumstances where the judiciary should 
intervene. 
Other constitutional principles aside, comity does not require 
that federal courts defer to legislatively created alternatives, but 
instead requires federal courts to respect the province of other 
 
 153. See Yackle, supra note 12, at 393–94. 
 154. Id. at 394. 
 155. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2240. 
 156. See id. at 2277. 
 157. See id. at 2259. 
 158. See id. at 2280 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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judicial tribunals. As the Boumediene case is actually a separation-of-
powers issue rather than an issue of federalism, the justification of 
comity appears to be inapplicable to the Boumediene circumstances. 
B. Judicial Efficiency 
The other consideration for requiring complete exhaustion of 
state remedies before a habeas petitioner can proceed to federal court 
is judicial efficiency.159 As noted in Gusik, the exhaustion doctrine 
seeks to prevent early intervention by the federal courts because such 
intervention may become utterly unnecessary once an alternative 
remedy is fully pursued.160 This sentiment was echoed by Roberts, 
who chided the Court for failing to dismiss the case and for 
interfering with the DTA review process when remand may have 
made such actions “entirely unnecessary.”161 Thus, judicial efficiency 
prescribes that if alternative remedies exist that potentially may fully 
adjudicate the petitioners’ claims, federal courts should refrain from 
intervening in an attempt to conserve federal judicial resources.162 
In evaluating whether dismissal of the Boumediene petitions 
would have been more judicially efficient, the principles announced 
in Gusik are helpful. In comparing the two cases, powerful 
similarities arise that cannot be overlooked. First, both cases arise out 
of the distinctive arena of executive action. The Gusik petition 
involves a collateral attack of a military decision,163 while in 
Boumediene the decision at issue involves a military determination.164 
Second, both cases involve statutory alternative remedies, which were 
authorized by both Congress and the Executive while the appeals 
were pending.165 
Notwithstanding these similarities, serious distinctions remain. In 
Gusik, even after exhaustion of the alternative remedy, the petitioner 
would still then have full access to the writ of habeas corpus.166 In 
fact, while the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals’ 
conclusion that exhaustion should be required, the Court reversed 
 
 159. Anderson, supra note 11, at 1204. 
 160. Gusik v. Schilder, 340 U.S. 128, 131–32 (1950). 
 161. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2281 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 162. See Anderson, supra note 11, at 1204. 
 163. Gusik, 340 U.S. at 129. 
 164. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2240. 
 165. Id. at 2241; Gusik, 340 U.S. at 130. 
 166. See Gusik, 340 U.S. at 132–133. 
DO NOT DELETE 2/8/2010 7:55 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2009 
1930 
the appellate court’s dismissal so that the petition could be held 
pending while the alternative remedy was pursued.167 Thus, even 
after the alternative remedy was exhausted, the petitioner in Gusik 
clearly retained full access to habeas relief. In Boumediene, by 
contrast, given that the MCA purportedly stripped all federal courts 
from all detainee habeas proceedings, the unexhausted remedy was 
the only available remedy.168 
In light of this comparison, Roberts’ assertion that requiring 
exhaustion in this instance is “merely a deferment” rather than a 
suspension of the writ169 loses a bit of its muster. While resort to the 
alternative remedy in Gusik may have been a simple deferment of 
habeas relief until a later date, resort to the DTA was a substitute 
proceeding designed to entirely supplant habeas review. Thus, the 
argument that interference by the Court may later prove to be an 
utter waste of federal judicial resources becomes rather suspect, as 
later interference by the Court may not have even been available. 
C. Special Circumstances Exception 
Although the exhaustion doctrine has become so enshrined in 
state habeas proceedings as to become axiomatic, courts continue to 
recognize that in “special circumstances” the exhaustion doctrine 
may be avoided.170 While the use of this exception is incredibly rare 
and not very well defined, two codified exceptions exist: when “there 
is an absence of available State corrective process,” or when 
“circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect 
the rights of the applicant.”171 Applying this exception to the case at 
hand, if the DTA review process inadequately protects the rights of 
the detainees, the Court is not required to mandate exhaustion of 
the administrative remedy. 
Before the adequacy of the DTA review is assessed, a brief 
discussion as to why the Court even engaged in an analysis of the 
DTA is necessary. Perhaps one of the most troubling aspects of the 
Boumediene decision is the fact that none of the petitioners had 
actually attempted to utilize the DTA remedy before the Court razed 
 
 167. Id. at 133. 
 168. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2266. 
 169. Id. at 2281 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 170. See Ex Parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 253 (1886). 
 171. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) (2006). 
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the entire system.172 Thus, in the mind of some critics, the Court 
invalidated a system that may have been entirely sound.173 But in 
comparing the Boumediene decision to other habeas cases where 
exhaustion was actually required, an intriguing distinction arises 
between an alternative remedy and a substitute remedy. In all of the 
exhaustion cases discussed in this Note, the unexhausted remedy was 
simply an alternative to habeas relief. Thus, even after the petitioner 
had resorted to the alternative remedy, habeas relief remained a 
viable option. Had the DTA review simply been an alternative 
remedy to habeas review, the Court’s opinion truly would have been 
an unfounded departure from a longstanding doctrine. Yet, the 
legislative history and the explicit language of the MCA and the 
DTA make it quite clear that the DTA review process was indeed 
intended to be a circumscribed substitute for habeas relief.174 Thus, 
the question before the Court becomes much more immediate and 
much more pressing. Had the Court required exhaustion of the 
substitute remedy, the Boumediene petitioners may have lost their 
right to habeas corpus altogether.175 Because of the grave 
implications at stake, the Court found it appropriate to engage in 
immediate appraisal of the adequacy of the DTA review. 
Returning to an analysis of the DTA, a strong case can be made 
that the DTA review is ineffective to protect the rights of the 
Guantanamo petitioners. As the scope of DTA review is limited to a 
review of the CSRT, an analysis of both the DTA and CSRT is 
necessary to determine the adequacy of the DTA process.176 In 
evaluating the CSRT, perhaps the most glaring weakness is the fact 
that the proceedings are “closed and accusatorial.”177 The CSRT 
provides detainees with only a “personal representative” who serves 
neither as counsel nor advocate for the petitioner, and the 
Government’s evidence is given a rebuttable presumption of 
validity.178 Furthermore, the Government is allowed to admit hearsay 
evidence as long as it is “relevant and helpful.”179 Far from the 
 
 172. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2281 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 2266 (majority opinion). 
 175. Id.  
 176. See id. at 2268–70. 
 177. See id. at 2270 (citation omitted). 
 178. Id. at 2260. 
 179. Id. at 2269 (citation omitted). 
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adversarial proceedings entitled to judicial deference, the CSRT 
appears to heavily favor the Government. 
Notwithstanding this structural bias in favor of the Government, 
the DTA review is limited to an evaluation of whether the 
Government fully complied with the CSRT procedures and the 
legality of those procedures.180 To be sure, an alternative remedy that 
limits the scope of review is appropriate when the petitioner already 
had a full opportunity to develop his claims.181 But when the lower 
proceeding begins with a presumption against the accused, the need 
for full review becomes more compelling.182 In this light, the fact 
that the DTA provides no opportunity for the petitioner to advance 
new evidence discovered since his CSRT becomes detrimental to the 
adequacy of the DTA review.183 
It should be noted that the detainee can request a new CSRT 
from the Deputy Secretary of Defense.184 This decision, however, is 
final and unreviewable.185 This opportunity to request a new 
proceeding is effectively the same remedy that the petitioner in Gusik 
was required to exhaust.186 Interestingly, the determination for the 
new trial in Gusik was to be made by the Judge Advocate General, 
and all determinations by the Judge were to be “final and 
conclusive” and “binding upon all departments, courts, agencies, 
and officers of the United States.”187 While the petitioner argued that 
this language appeared to foreclose later habeas review, the Court 
found that had Congress “intended to deprive the civil courts of 
their habeas corpus jurisdiction, which has been exercised from the 
beginning, the break with history would have been so marked that 
we believe the purpose would have been made plain and 
unmistakable.”188 Thus, the Court found that the new remedy in no 
way sought to foreclose later habeas review in federal court. 
By contrast, in Boumediene Congress explicitly intended to 
deprive the civil courts of their habeas corpus jurisdiction.189  
 
 180. Id. at 2274. 
 181. Id. at 2273. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 2272. 
 184. Id. at 2273. 
 185. Id. at 2273–74. 
 186. See Gusik v. Schilder, 340 U.S. 128, 130–31 (1950). 
 187. Id. at 132. 
 188. Id. at 132–33. 
 189. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2265–66. 
DO NOT DELETE 2/8/2010 7:55 PM 
1907 Special Circumstances Exception 
 1933 
As aforementioned, the explicit language and legislative history of 
the MCA and the DTA make it clear that Congress intended to 
foreclose any later resort to habeas review.190 Thus, the finality of the 
Deputy Secretary of Defense’s decision becomes much more 
important than in Gusik. 
Totaling the restrictive nature of the CSRT, the circumscribed 
DTA review, the unreviewable decision whether to convene a new 
CSRT, and the express intent to foreclose any resort to habeas 
review, the DTA process appears grossly inadequate to protect the 
rights of the petitioners. In light of these considerations, the Court 
appears to be justified in deeming these circumstances “exceptional” 
and foregoing any requirement of exhaustion. 
V. CONCLUSION 
While exhaustion is typically required of habeas petitioners who 
have yet to pursue an alternative remedy available in another forum, 
the Boumediene case highlights when that principle can be eschewed. 
In comparing the policies favoring exhaustion with the circumstances 
surrounding Boumediene, one can see that none of the justifications 
adequately apply to the Guantanamo detainees. While the Court fell 
short of adequately explaining why exhaustion is inappropriate, it 
appears to have nonetheless decided the issue correctly. By not 
requiring exhaustion, the Court upheld the fundamental principles 
underlying the writ of habeas corpus and sent a strong signal to both 
the Executive and Legislative Branches that if they attempt to 
provide a substitute for habeas protections, the substitute must 
provide substantially similar protections to those afforded in a 
traditional habeas proceeding. 
Brandon C. Pond 
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